The Constitutional Right to Be a Parent

[Jim]

Below are excerpts of caselaw from state appellate and federal district courts and up to the U.S. Supreme Court, all of which affirm, from one perspective or another, the absolute Constitutional right of parents to actually BE parents to their children.



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The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by this amendment (First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14. Doe v. Irwin, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S. D.C. of Michigan, (1985).

The several states have no greater power to restrain individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the United States. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S Ct 2479; 472 US 38, (1985).

Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the burden of proving which rests on their government. Elrod v. Burns, 96 S Ct 2673; 427 US 347, (1976).

Law and court procedures that are "fair on their faces" but administered "with an evil eye or a heavy hand" was discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, (1886).

Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain vital interest in preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life; if anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S Ct 1388; 455 US 745, (1982).

Parents have a fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity of legal bond with their children. Matter of Delaney, 617 P 2d 886, Oklahoma (1980). .

The liberty interest of the family encompasses an interest in retaining custody of one's children and, thus, a state may not interfere with a parent's custodial rights absent due process protections. Langton v. Maloney, 527 F Supp 538, D.C. Conn. (1981).

Parent's right to custody of child is a right encompassed within protection of this amendment which may not be interfered with under guise of protecting public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within competency of state to effect. Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S Ct 1598, 435 US 963, IL, (1977).

Parent's interest in custody of her children is a liberty interest which has received considerable constitutional protection; a parent who is deprived of custody of his or her child, even though temporarily, suffers thereby grievous loss and such loss deserves extensive due process protection. In the Interest of Cooper, 621 P 2d 437; 5 Kansas App Div 2d 584, (1980).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that severance in the parent-child relationship caused by the state occur only with rigorous protections for individual liberty interests at stake. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F 2d 1205; US Ct App 7th Cir WI, (1984).

Father enjoys the right to associate with his children which is guaranteed by this amendment (First) as incorporated in Amendment 14, or which is embodied in the concept of "liberty" as that word is used in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F Supp 620; DC, WI (1973).

"Separated as our issue is from that of the future interests of the children, we have before us the elemental question whether a court of a state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present, may cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in personam. Rights far more precious to appellant than property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of custody." May v. Anderson, 345 US 528, 533; 73 S Ct 840, 843, (1952).

A parent's right to care and companionship of his or her children are so fundamental, as to be guaranteed protection under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In re: J.S. and C., 324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489.

The Court stressed, "the parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children rises to a constitutionally secured right, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208, (1972).

Parent's rights have been recognized as being "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free man." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390; 43 S Ct 625, (1923).

The U.S. Supreme Court implied that "a (once) married father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child. Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S Ct 549; 434 US 246, 255^Q56, (1978).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (California) held that the parent-child relationship is a constitutionally protected liberty interest. (See; Declaration of Independence --life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution -- No state can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor deny any person the equal protection of the laws.) Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F 2d 651; US Ct App 9th Cir, (1985).

The parent-child relationship is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 f 2d 1205, 1242^Q45; US Ct App 7th Cir WI, (1985).

No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child." Carson v. Elrod, 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976).

A parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his children. A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsible, reliable adult. Franz v. U.S., 707 F 2d 582, 595^Q599; US Ct App (1983).

A parent's right to the custody of his or her children is an element of "liberty" guaranteed by the 5th Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Matter of Gentry, 369 NW 2d 889, MI App Div (1983).

Reality of private biases and possible injury they might inflict were impermissible considerations under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S Ct 1879; 466 US 429.

Legislative classifications which distributes benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the proper place of women and their need for special protection; thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination against women must be carefully tailored. the state cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex. Orr v. Orr, 99 S Ct 1102; 440 US 268, (1979).

The United States Supreme Court held that the "old notion" that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials" can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US 7, 10; 95 S Ct 1373, 1376, (1975).

Judges must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with particular emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and impartiality. 28 USCA § 2411; Pfizer v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532; cert denied 92 S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN, (1972).

State Judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights. Gross v. State of Illinois, 312 F 2d 257; (1963).

The Constitution also protects "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Federal Courts (and State Courts), under Griswold can protect, under the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" phrase of the Declaration of Independence, the right of a man to enjoy the mutual care, company, love and affection of his children, and this cannot be taken away from him without due process of law. There is a family right to privacy which the state cannot invade or it becomes actionable for civil rights damages. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, (1965).

The right of a parent not to be deprived of parental rights without a showing of fitness, abandonment or substantial neglect is so fundamental and basic as to rank among the rights contained in this Amendment (Ninth) and Utah's Constitution, Article 1 § 1. In re U.P., 648 P 2d 1364; Utah, (1982).

The rights of parents to parent-child relationships are recognized and upheld. Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A 2d 593, (1956); Brennan v. Brennan, 454 A 2d 901, (1982). State's power to legislate, adjudicate and administer all aspects of family law, including determinations of custodial; and visitation rights, is subject to scrutiny by federal judiciary within reach of due process and/or equal protection clauses of 14th Amendment...Fourteenth Amendment applied to states through specific rights contained in the first eight amendments of the Constitution which declares fundamental personal rights...Fourteenth Amendment encompasses and applied to states those preexisting fundamental rights recognized by the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment acknowledged the prior existence of fundamental rights with it: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The United States Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, has recognized that matters involving marriage, procreation, and the parent-child relationship are among those fundamental "liberty" interests protected by the Constitution. Thus, the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147, (1973), was recently described by the Supreme Court as founded on the "Constitutional underpinning of ... a recognition that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment includes not only the freedoms explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life." The non-custodial divorced parent has no way to implement the constitutionally protected right to maintain a parental relationship with his child except through visitation. To acknowledge the protected status of the relationship as the majority does, and yet deny protection under Title 42 USC § 1983, to visitation, which is the exclusive means of effecting that right, is to negate the right completely. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, (1981).

FROM THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT, 1910
In controversies affecting the custody of an infant, the interest and welfare of the child is the primary and controlling question by which the court must be guided. This rule is based upon the theory that the state must perpetuate itself, and good citizenship is essential to that end. Though nature gives to parents the right to the custody of their own children, and such right is scarcely less sacred than the right to life and liberty, and is manifested in all animal life, yet among mankind the necessity for government has forced the recognition of the rule that the perpetuity of the state is the first consideration, and parental authority itself is subordinate to this supreme power. It is recognized that: 'The moment a child is born it owes allegiance to the government of the country of its birth, and is entitled to the protection of that government. And such government is obligated by its duty of protection, to consult the welfare, comfort and interest of such child in regulating its custody during the period of its minority.' Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 64, 103, 35 Am. Dec. 653; McKercher v. Green, 13 Colo. App. 271, 58 Pac. 406. But as government should never interfere with the natural rights of man, except only when it is essential for the good of society, the state recognizes, and enforces, the right which nature gives to parents [48 Colo. 466] to the custody of their own children, and only supervenes with its sovereign power when the necessities of the case require it.
The experience of man has demonstrated that the best development of a young life is within the sacred precincts of a home, the members of which are bound together by ties entwined through 'bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh'; that it is in such homes and under such influences that the sweetest, purest, noblest, and most attractive qualities of human nature, so essential to good citizenship, are best nurtured and grow to wholesome fruition; that, when a state is based and builded upon such homes, it is strong in patriotism, courage, and all the elements of the best civilization. Accordingly these recurring facts in the experience of man resulted in a presumption establishing prima facie that parents are in every way qualified to have the care, custody, and control of their own offspring, and that their welfare and interests are best subserved under such control. Thus, by natural law, by common law, and, likewise, the statutes of this state, the natural parents are entitled to the custody of their minor children, except when they are unsuitable persons to be intrusted with their care, control, and education, or when some exceptional circumstances appear which render such custody inimicable to the best interests of the child. While the right of a parent to the custody of its infant child is therefore, in a sense, contingent, the right can never be lost or taken away so long as the parent properly nurtures, maintains, and cares for the child.
Wilson v. Mitchell, 111 P. 21, 25-26, 48 Colo. 454 (Colo. 1910)



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[Jim]

Constitutional Protection for Parental Rights

The Meyer-Pierce Legacy

Robert P. George and Jana V.T. Baldwin

June, 1994

[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child [should] reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.1

The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.2

For the last several decades, a significant amount of social and legal commentary has focused on the relationship of parent to child and the family to the state. As the economic and political life of America has changed profoundly over the years, family law has correspondingly undergone a host of changes. Today, as a result of the crisis confronting the American family, a scholarly, legal and public debate rages over family policy.3


"Children's Rights" advocates argue that children should have, and the state should recognize, greater autonomy from their parents in deciding how to live. Indeed, some scholars and activists argue for the liberation of children from their parents control as part of a larger attack on the
institution of the nuclear family.4

Against this backdrop, the Constitution limits the use of state power to diminish parental rights and undermine the family. Although the Constitution
does not deal explicitly with parental authority, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized parental rights of custody and control. In the landmark decision of Meyer v. Nebraska,5 closely followed by Pierce v. Society of Sisters,6 the Court stated that parents have a substantive due process right to "bring up children."7 Although these cases were handed down in the 1920s they are no mere archaisms, but rather have withstood the test of time. Indeed, Justice Brennan has remarked of Meyer and its progeny: "I think I am safe in saying that no one doubts the wisdom or validity of those decisions."8 The precedents Meyer and Pierce generated have further solidified the principle that parents should have the predominant role in raising their children.

In Meyer,9 the Supreme Court held that the right of parents to raise their children free from unreasonable state interferences is one of the unwritten "liberties" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.10

The Court invalidated a state statute prohibiting foreign language instruction to school children, recognizing the right of German-speaking parents to have their children taught German. The Court
found that the state's interest in encouraging American ideals by prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages is not great enough to permit infringement of the rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit.11 The Court rested its opinion in large part on the rights of parents
to control the activities of their children,12 concluding that the statute was an interference "...with the power of parents to control the education of their own."13

Two years after Meyer, the Supreme Court in Pierce14 invalidated an Oregon statute requiring parents to send their children to public school, holding
that the statute "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."15 Pierce made clear that the constitutional rights of a parent are
not limited to physical custody, but that parents possess the right to direct their child's "destiny."16

The principle enunciated by Meyer and Pierce, that parents have the right to direct the upbringing and education of their children, has survived the
many turbulent changes of the last several decades. A line of decisions following Meyer and Pierce further cemented the rights of parents to exercise their own best judgment in raising their children. For example, twenty years after Pierce, the Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts17
stated that "t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."18

Meyer also helped undergird the Supreme Court's decision in Parham v. J.R.19 In Parham, the Supreme Court deferred to parents' wishes to place their child in a mental hospital, stating that "the law's concept of the
family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions.20 The Court emphasized that simply "because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves
risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state."21

More recently, in the prominent case of Santosky v. Kramer,22 the Supreme Court acknowledged that "freedom of personal choice in matters of family
life is a fundamental liberty" and stated that natural parents have a "fundamental liberty interest...in the care, custody, and management of their child."23 Similarly, in Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n,24 the Supreme Court recognized "a presumption...that parents are the appropriate decisionmaker for their infants."25

The constitutional protection of parental rights recognized by the federal courts has been affirmed and enforced by state courts.26 The recent case of Alfonso v. Fernandez27 illustrates that the parental rights doctrine, while
viable, is under attack today. In Alfonso, parents of New York high school students challenged the New York School Board's condom distribution program, arguing, among other things, that the program unconstitutionally denied
parents the right to opt their children out of the distribution program. On December 30, 1993, a New York appeals court held that the New York Board of
Education's condom distribution program was illegal and unconstitutional absent a parental opt-out provision. Citing Meyer and Pierce, the court recognized that the petitioners enjoy a "well-recognized liberty interest in
rearing and educating their children in accord with their own views..." including "the right to regulate their children's sexual behavior as best they can..."28 The court determined that "no matter how laudable its purpose, by excluding parental involvement, the condom availability
component of the program impermissibly trespasse[d] on the petitioners' parents rights" by substituting the School Board's judgment for the petitioners' judgment without a compelling necessity.29

Alfonso demonstrates that the Constitution still stands as a staunch defender of parental rights. Alfonso and its parental rights predecessors such as Meyer and Pierce are rooted in the recognition that parents possess
the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under theircontrol."30

Despite the firm constitutional basis for parental rights, traditional concepts of parental authority are under attack from private and public groups seeking to give the state greater control of the upbringing of children, as evidenced by the appeals in the Alfonso case. Opponents of
parental rights understand perfectly well the significance of Meyer and Pierce as obstacles to their agenda, and the need to undermine these precedents in order to achieve their goals.31

In accordance with the court's decision in Alfonso, the New York Board of Education voted to revise the condom distribution policy to permit parents or guardians of unemancipated students to opt their children out of the
distribution component of the program. The New York Civil Liberties Union ("NYCLU"), however, moved to intervene in the action for the purposes of
filing an appeal and People About Changing Education ("PACE") and the Coalition For the Homeless moved for leave to appear as amici curiae to argue in favor of reversing the court's ruling. These groups argued that
affording "parents or guardians an `absolute veto' over unemancipated minors [ability] to receive condoms [in school] impermissibly infringes on New York City public school students' [constitutional] rights."32 The court denied NYCLU's motion to intervene, and the NYCLU lost a subsequent appeal of that denial. The New York Bar Association and the New York State Attorney General
had also moved to appear as amici curiae in favor of the NYCLU's motion to intervene and in opposition to the court's ruling.

The relentless zeal with which the NYCLU (and even the State of New York, as represented by the New York Attorney General), sought to overturn the
court's ruling in Alfonso makes clear that the right of parents to make substantive choices regarding their children's education and moral upbringing remains in jeopardy.

In short, the protection of parental rights should not have to be achieved on a piecemeal basis through unpredictable and expensive court challenges. The constitutional mandate articulated by Meyer and its progeny is clear: The right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children shall not be infringed.

Robert P. George is an Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and a Presidential Appointee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. He is the author of Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public
Morality (Oxford University Press, 1993). Jana V.T. Baldwin was counsel for plaintiffs in Alfonso v. Fernandez, the December, 1993 decision which overturned New York City's condom distribution policy.

The views expressed in this memo are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of other organizations with whom they are affiliated.

Endnotes


1. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
2. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
3. For commentary discussing the difficulties facing today's family, see generally, Giving Children a Chance: The Case for More Effective National Policies, (George Miller ed., 1989); Sylvia Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks: The Cost of Neglecting Our Children (1991); Rebuilding the Nest: A New Commitment to the American Family (David Blankenhorn et al. eds., 1990).
4. See generally, Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parent's Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993) (arguing that parents' rights, "as currently understood, undermine values of responsibility and mutuality necessary to children's welfare"); Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,
70 Va. L. Rev. 879, 882 (1984) (challenging "the law's adherence to the exclusive view of parenthood when the premise of the nuclear family has failed").
5. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
6. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
7. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
8. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142 (Brennan, J.
dissenting).
9. 262 U.S. 399 (1923).
10. Id. at 399 ("[T]he liberty [guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to...marry, establish a home and bring up children"). Conservative critics of the notion of substantive due process have observed that Meyer (and Pierce) is
defensible even if the substantive due process doctrine on which the Court relied is not. See, eg., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 47-49.
11. Id. at 400-01.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 401.
14. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
15. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
16. Id.
17. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
18. Id. at 166.
19. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
20. Id. at 602.
21. Id. at 603.
22. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
23. Id. at 753.
24. 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (plurality opinion).
25. Id. at 628 n.13 (quoting President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical problems in Medicine and Biomedical Behavior Research, Report, at 212-214 (1983)).
26. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993) ("the reasoning of federal constitutional cases convince us that parental rights constitute a fundamental liberty interest" under the Tennessee Constitution); Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d
1015, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) ("we are fully cognizant of
parents' well settled right under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their families generally as they see fit"); Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1984) ("the parenting right is a fundamental liberty interest that is protected against unwarranted state intrusion"); People v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d
1049, 1052 (N.Y. 1981) (it "is well settled that parents
generally have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to raise their families as they see fit").
27. 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
28. Id. at 265.
29. Id.
30. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972); Meyer, 262
U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
31. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property" 33 William and Mary Law Review, 995 (1992)
32. Brief Amici Curiae of People About Changing Education (PACE) and the Coalition for the Homeless at p. 13.


. For commentary discussing the difficulties facing today's
family, see generally, Giving Children a Chance: The Case for More Effective National Policies, (George Miller ed., 1989);
Sylvia Hewlett, When the Bough Breaks: The Cost of Neglecting Our Children (1991); Rebuilding the Nest: A New Commitment to the American Family (David Blankenhorn et al. eds., 1990).

. See generally, Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parent's Rights, 14 Cardozo L.

Rev. 1747 (1993) (arguing that parents' rights, "as currently understood, undermine values of responsibility and mutuality necessary to children's welfare"); Katherine T. Bartlett,

Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,

70 Va. L. Rev. 879, 882 (1984) (challenging "the law's adherence to the exclusive view of parenthood when the premise of the nuclear family has failed").

. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

[Jim]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE A PARENT

On this page you will find the real law, which family courts ignore every day for their own convenience and personal agenda. Know your rights and fight for them!! If you do not you have no one to blame but yourself. This requires much work and study and attorney's will generally not help you here for fear of upsetting judges but your children are worth this effort as it is scientifically proven that children do ENORMOUSLY better in virtually all ways when they have equal access to both parents in a shared parenting relationship.

The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by this amendment (First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14. Doe v. Irwin, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S. D.C. of Michigan, (1985).

The several states has no greater power to restrain individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the United States. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S Ct 2479; 472 US 38, (1985).

Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the burden of proving which rests on their government. Elrod v. Burns, 96 S Ct 2673; 427 US 347, (1976).

Law and court procedures that are "fair on their faces" but administered "with an evil eye or a heavy hand" was discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, (1886).

Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain vital interest in preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life; if anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S Ct 1388; 455 US 745, (1982).

Parents have a fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity of legal bond with their children. Matter of Delaney, 617 P 2d 886, Oklahoma (1980). <Verify citation>.

The liberty interest of the family encompasses an interest in retaining custody of one's children and, thus, a state may not interfere with a parent's custodial rights absent due process protections. Langton v. Maloney, 527 F Supp 538, D.C. Conn. (1981).

Parent's right to custody of child is a right encompassed within protection of this amendment which may not be interfered with under guise of protecting public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within competency of state to effect. Reynold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S Ct 1598, 435 US 963, IL, (1977).

Parent's interest in custody of her children is a liberty interest which has received considerable constitutional protection; a parent who is deprived of custody of his or her child, even though temporarily, suffers thereby grievous loss and such loss deserves extensive due process protection. In the Interest of Cooper, 621 P 2d 437; 5 Kansas App Div 2d 584, (1980).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that severance in the parent-child relationship caused by the state occur only with rigorous protections for individual liberty interests at stake. Bell v.City of Milwaukee, 746 F 2d 1205; US Ct App 7th Cir WI, (1984).

Father enjoys the right to associate with his children which is guaranteed by this amendment (First) as incorporated in Amendment 14, or which is embodied in`the concept of "liberty" as that word is used in the Due Process`Clause of`the 14th Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F Supp 620; DC, WI (1973).

The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property right. May v. Anderson, 345 US 528, 533; 73 S Ct 840,843,(1952).

A parent's right to care and companionship of his or her children are so fundamental, as to be guaranteed protection under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In re: J.S.and C.,324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489.

The Court stressed, "the parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably

Warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children rises to a constitutionally secured right, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208,(1972).

Parent's rights have been recognized as being "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free man." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 or 426 US 390 <check cite>; 43 S Ct 625, (1923).

The U.S. Supreme Court implied that "a(once) married father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child. Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S Ct 549; 434 US 246, 255-56, (1978).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (California) held that the parent-child relationship is a constitutionally protected liberty interest. (See; Declaration of Independence --life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution -- No state can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor deny any person the equal protection of the laws.) Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F 2d 651; US Ct App 9th Cir, (1985).

The parent-child relationship is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 f 2d 1205, 1242-45; US Ct App 7th Cir WI, (1985).

No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child." Carson v. Elrod, 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976).

A parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability

To participate in the rearing of his children. A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsible, reliable adult. Franz v. U.S., 707 F 2d 582, 595-599; US Ct App (1983).

A parent's right to the custody of his or her children is an element of "liberty" guaranteed by the 5th Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Matter of Gentry, 369 NW 2d 889, MI App Div (1983).

Reality of private biases and possible injury they might inflict were impermissible considerations

under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Palmore v.Sidoti, 104 S Ct 1879; 466 US 429.

Legislative classifications which distributes benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the proper place of women and their need for special protection; thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination against women must be carefully tailored. the state cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex. Orr v. Orr, 99 S Ct 1102; 4340 US 268 <check cite>, (1979).

The United States Supreme Court held that the "old notion" that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials" can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US 7, 10; 95 S Ct 1373, 1376, (1975).

Judges must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with particular emphasis upon Conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and impartiality. 28 USCA § 2411;

Pfizer v. Lord, 456 F 2d 532; cert denied 92 S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN, (1972).

State Judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights. Gross v.State of Illinois, 312 F 2d 257; (1963).

The Constitution also protects "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Federal Courts (and State Courts), under Griswold can protect, under the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" phrase of the Declaration of Independence, the right of a man to enjoy the mutual care, company, love and affection of his children, and this cannot be taken away from him without due process of law. There is a family right to privacy which the state cannot invade or it becomes actionable for civil rights damages. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, (1965).

The right of a parent not to be deprived of parental rights without a showing of fitness, abandonment or substantial neglect is so fundamental and basic as to rank among the rights contained in this Amendment (Ninth) and Utah's Constitution, Article 1 § 1. In re U.P., 648 P 2d 1364;Utah, (1982).

The rights of parents to parent-child relationships are recognized and upheld. Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A 2d 593, (1956); Brennan v.Brennan, 454 A 2d 901, (1982).

State's power to legislate, adjudicate and administer all aspects of family law, including determinations of custodial; and visitation rights, is subject to scrutiny by federal judiciary within reach of due process and/or equal protection clauses of 14th Amendment...Fourteenth Amendment applied to states through specific rights contained in the first eight amendments of the Constitution which declares fundamental personal rights...Fourteenth Amendment encompasses and applied to states those preexisting fundamental rights recognized by the Ninth

Amendment. The Ninth Amendment acknowledged the prior existence of fundamental rights with it: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The United States Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, has recognized that matters involving marriage, procreation, and the parent-child relationship are among those fundamental "liberty" interests protected by the Constitution. Thus, the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147, (1973), was recently described by the Supreme Court as founded on the "Constitutional underpinning of ... a recognition that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment includes not only the freedoms explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a

freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life." The non-custodial divorced parent has no way to implement the constitutionally protected right to maintain a parental relationship with his child except through visitation. To acknowledge the protected status of the relationship as the majority does, and yet deny protection under Title 42 USC § 1983, to visitation, which is the exclusive means of effecting that right, is to negate the right completely. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F 2d 1328, (1981).

[Jim]

U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Our legal minds will put the cites below to good use. Please feel free to share them with your attorney.

Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the burden of proving which rests on the government. Elrod v. Burns, 96 S.Ct. 2673; 427 U.S. 347, (1976).

The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property right. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, (1952).

The Court (U.S. Supreme Court) stressed, "the parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children rises to a constitutionally secured right, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651; 92 S.Ct. 1208, (1972)

The U.S. Supreme Court implied that "a (once) married father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child. Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S.Ct. 549; 434 U.S. 246, 255-56, (1978)

Law and court procedures that are "fair on their faces" but administered "with an evil eye or a heavy hand" was discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, (1886)

The Constitution also protects "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Federal Courts (and State Courts), under Griswold can protect, under the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" phrase of the Declaration of Independence, the right of a man to enjoy the mutual care, company, love and affection of his children, and this cannot be taken away from him without due process of law. There is a family right to privacy which the state cannot invade or it becomes actionable for civil rights damages. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, (1965)

Parent's right to custody of child is a right encompassed within protection of this amendment which may not be interfered with under guise of protection public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within competency of state to effect. Reynold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S.Ct. 1598, 435 U.S. 963, Il, (1977)

Parent's rights have been recognized as being "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free man." Meyer v. Nebraska, 92 S.Ct. 1208, (1972)

Reality of private biases and possible injury they might inflict were impermissible considerations under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S.Ct. 1879; 466 U.S. 429

Legislative classifications which distributes benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the proper place of women and their need for special protection; thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination against women must be carefully tailored... the state cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex. Orr v. Orr, 99 S.Ct. 1102; 4340 U.S. 268 (1979)

The United States Supreme Court held that the "old notion" that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials" can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of sex. No longer is the female destined solely for the homes and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10; 95 S.Ct. 1373, 1376 (1975)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that severance in the parent-child relationship caused by the state occur only with rigorous protections for individual liberty interests at stake. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F 2d 1205: U.S. Ct. App. 7th Cir. WI., (1984)

COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
The following Supreme Court decisions were cited in a published opinion by Chief judge Norman K. Moon of Court of Appeals of Virginia June 3, 1997 in the case Williams and Williams v. Williams and Williams 24 Va. App. 778; 485 S.E. 2d 651 (June 3, 1997)

Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain vital interest in preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life; if anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. The Supreme Court noted its "historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S.Ct. 1388; 455 U.S. 745, (1982).

In applying the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has held that "[w]here certain fundamental rights are involved... regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' ...and ...legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. State interference with a fundamental right must by justified by a "compelling state interest." Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 155 ; 93 S.Ct. 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147, (1973)

State's power to legislate, adjudicate and administer all aspects of family law, including determinations of custodial and visitation rights, is subject to scrutiny by federal judiciary within reach of due process and/or equal protection clause of 14th Amendment... fourteenth Amendment applied to states through specific rights contained in the first eight amendments of the Constitution which declares fundamental personal rights... Fourteenth Amendment encompasses and applied to states those pre-existing fundamental rights recognized by the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment acknowledged the prior existence of fundamental rights with it: " The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. "The United States Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, has recognized that matters involving marriage, procreation, and the parent-child relationship are among those fundamental "liberty" interests protected by the Constitution. Thus, the decision in Roe v. Wade, as recently described by the Supreme Court as founded on the "Constitutional underpinning of... a recognition that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment includes not only the freedoms explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life."

While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] ... Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).

In addition to recognizing as a fundamental liberty interest the right of parents to raise their children, the Supreme Court has also established that the Constitution's guarantee to fundamental privacy rights also embodies a fundamental right to parental autonomy in child rearing. The Court acknowledged a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, 3210 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431-U.S. 494 (1977)

The Supreme Court has clearly established that to constitute a compelling interest, state interference with a parent's right to raise his or her child must be for the purpose of protecting the child's health or welfare. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972)

Father enjoys the right to associate with his children which is guaranteed by this amendment (First) as incorporated in Amendment 14, or which is embodied in the concept of "liberty" as that word is used in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F Supp 620: D.C., WI (1973)

SUPPORTING FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
The rights of parents to care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by this amendment (First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14. Doe v. Irwin , 440 F Supp 1247; U.S.D.C. of Michigan, (1985)

Parent's interest in custody of her children is a liberty interest which has received considerable constitutional protection; a parent who is deprived of custody of his or her child, even though temporarily, suffers thereby grievous loss and such loss deserves extensive due process protection. In the Interest of Cooper, 621 P 2d 437: 5 Kansas App Div 2d 584, (1980)

A parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his children. A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsible, reliable adult. Franz v. U.S., 707 F 2d 582, 58-95-599; U.S. Ct. App. (1983)

The liberty interest of the family encompasses an interest in retaining custody of one's children and, thus a state may not interfere with a parent's custodial rights absent due process protections. Langton v. Maloney, 527 F Supp 538, D.C. Conn. (1981)

A parent's right to the custody of his or her children is an element of "liberty" guaranteed by the 5th Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Matter of Gentry, 369 NW 2d 889, MI App. Div. (1983)

The parent-child relationship is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F 2d 1205, 1242-45; U.S. Ct. App 7th Cir. WI.

No bond is more precious and non should be more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child. Carson v. Elrod, 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976)

The non-custodial divorced parent has no way to implement the constitutionally protected right to maintain a parental relationship with his child except through visitation. To acknowledge the protected status of the relationship as the majority does, and yet deny protection under Title 42 USC Section 1983, to visitation, which is the exclusive means of effecting that right, is to negate the right completely. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F 2d 1328, (1981)

The rights of parents to parent-child relationships are recognized and upheld. Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A 2d 593, (1956); Brennan v. Brennan, 454 A 2d 901, (1982)

U.S. Supreme Court
It would seem that the Constitution is violated more than it is honored in matters involving domestic relations. -AFC
ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 410 U.S. 113

ROE ET AL. v. WADE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DALLAS COUNTY, APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 70-18.

Argued December 13, 1971 Reargued October 11, 1972, Decided January 22, 1973

Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling state interest," Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 485; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1940); see [410 U.S. 113, 156] Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 460, 463-464 (WHITE, J., concurring in result)....

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring. ...Several decisions of this Court make clear that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12; Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541.

As recently as last Term, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, we recognized "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person [410 U.S. 113, 170]....


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U.S. Supreme Court

SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

455 U.S. 745

SANTOSKY ET AL. v. KRAMER, COMMISSIONER, ULSTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

No. 80-5889. Argued November 10, 1981. Decided March 24, 1982

In Lassiter.... The absence of dispute reflected this Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-652 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)....


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U.S. Supreme Court

HARRIS v. McRAE, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)

448 U.S. 297

HARRIS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. McRAE ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 79-1268. Argued April 21, 1980. Decided June 30, 1980.

...It is well settled that, quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively unconstitutional." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (plurality opinion). Accordingly, before turning to the equal protection issue in this case, we examine whether the Hyde Amendment violates any substantive rights secured by the Constitution....


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U.S. Supreme Court

COOPER v. AARON, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)

358 U.S. 1

COOPER ET AL., MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE LITTLE ROCK,

ARKANSAS, INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. v. AARON ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

Fn No. 1. Argued September 11, 1958. Decided September 12, 1958. Opinion announced September 29, 1958.

...Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, "to support this Constitution." Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this requirement reflected the framers' "anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State . . . ."


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Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 524.

No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: "If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery . . . ." United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136. A Governor who asserts a [358 U.S. 1, 19] power to nullify a federal court order is similarly restrained. If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes, in 1932, also for a unanimous Court, "it is manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases . . . ." Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-398....

[Jim]

Constitutional Law Summary for Parents
created by Daniel Lee, ACFC Associate Director

Family Law Reference for Parents

This is the first update to a paper written as a guide for parents and legal professionals on family law. Primarily it is the words of the judges themselves, with some commentary to help explain concepts. Upon updating it became so complicated that it needed to be divided into two parts, and this is now the introductory one. If you wish to learn in more depth, this documents big brother (with full case citations) is available to officers of Childs Best Interest, or to judges and state attorney generals when they send a request on their letterhead to: 357 Dove Valley Collierville, TN 38017.

The relation between family and constitutional law needs to be clearly understood. Constitutional law has "bright lines" that identify areas where the state cannot tread. As of today all states' family law consists of a jumble of rules and practices, many of which have little to no relation to these bright lines. The ensuing disorder allows judges great and improper discretion.

As I update the original paper, and so to with writing the original, no help was provided from legal professionals. We told hundreds of lawyers, judges, appellate justices, law school professors, state representatives and senators, and attorney generals about the problems in family law. None attempted to refute or add to the information. On a better note, many good rulings have recently been released by the Tennessee Middle and Eastern Section Appellate Courts. Nevertheless, it is clear today there is total failure in family law, and the legal profession in general.

Most of the research and development fell to me, with others providing real and useful input. Don, Chuck, and Dennis, of Ohio PACE, Mike "MD/JD" in California, Murray in Virginia, Karen in Alabama, members of Childs Best Interest across the U.S., and shared parenting advocates who acted as sounding boards and provided assistance in other small or large ways. Also help from the kind student librarians at the University of Memphis Law School Library was very useful and appreciated.

Today in most family law cases attorneys are not raising a constitutional shield to protect their clients. And when they fail to do that, a very cruel thing happens. Not only are one or both parent's ability to parent their child indefinitely suspended with the state taking permanent jurisdiction of their child, but in legal terminology they will be considered to have voluntarily waived their right to parent their child! That's pretty harsh to say a parent has voluntarily given this up, when it was only the attorney who failed to raise the constitutional arguments, but that's the legal standard. If you are a parent not in an intact married relationship, or out of one and haven't been designated the primary caregiver, somewhere along the line you surrendered your right to parent your child.

The following pages are to help all parents understand their rights in relation to raising their children. Having this knowledge will allow you to defend yourself and your child if ever required.

This document may be freely reproduced, and if doing so please credit the author. If you are in an actual case, please remember this information is not legal advice. Every case is unique and must be tailored accordingly by a litigant acting as their own attorney, or an actual one.

Section 1 Controlling Law
Sections of the Constitutions where parental rights derive

The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Santosky v. Kramer United States Supreme Court (1982)

The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Doe v. Irwin United States District Court of Michigan (1977)

Tennessee's historically strong protection of parental rights and the reasoning of federal constitutional cases convince us that parental rights constitute a fundamental liberty interest under Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution Hawk v. Hawk Tennessee Supreme Court (1993)

Parents have comparable interests under our state constitutional protections of liberty and privacy rights. "The right to the custody and control of one's child is a fiercely guarded right in our society and in our law. It is a right that should be infringed upon only under the most compelling circumstances." Brooks v. Parkerson Georgia Supreme Court (1995)

A parent's constitutionally protected right to rear his or her children without state interference, has been recognized as a fundamental "liberty" interest protect by the Fourteenth Amendment and also as a fundamental right derived from the privacy rights inherent in the constitution. In re Smith Washington Supreme Court (1998)

parent's right to the care, custody, and control of his or her children is a fundamental right protected by article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Santi v. Santi Iowa Supreme Court (2001)

Parental Autonomy is the condition that exists when a child is not subject to a judge's jurisdiction

Parental autonomy is grounded in the assumption that natural parents raise their own children in nuclear families, consisting of a married couple and their children. The family has been seen as the "basic building block" of society. Parental autonomy strengthens the family and the entire social fabric "by encouraging parents to raise their children in the best way they can by making them secure in the knowledge that neither the state nor outside individuals may ordinarily intervene." In re Smith Washington Supreme Court (1998) Note 1: We are aware of 1 parent outside of an intact married family receiving parental autonomy via a consent order. Wickman v. Dixon No.DR-96-1360.01C p.489. Note 2: Presumably parental autonomy exists in adoptive families with either one or two parents, and in natural parents who have sole custody with the other parent's rights terminated, so it is not tied to married parents.

Parental Rights are Fundamental Liberty Interests

The liberty interest at issue in this case - - the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court Troxel v. Granville United States Supreme Court (2000)

It is well-settled that parents have a liberty interest in the custody of their children. Hence, any deprivation of that interest by the state must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requirements of due process." Hooks v. Hooks United States Court of Appeals (1985)

Indeed, the right to rear one's children is so firmly rooted in our culture that the United States Supreme Court has held it to be a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hawk v. Hawk Tennessee Supreme Court (1993)

Parental Rights also contain Fundamental Privacy Interests

"

rivate realm of family life which the state cannot enter" Prince v. Massachusetts United States Supreme Court (1944)

Throughout this century, this Court also has held that the fundamental right to privacy protects citizens against governmental intrusion in such intimate family matters as procreation, child-rearing, marriage, and contraceptive choice. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey United States Supreme Court (1992)

Statutes and rulings that infringe upon fundamental rights are presumptively unconstitutional, and a substantial burden rests on the state, not citizen, to prove its case

It is well settled that, quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution it is presumptively unconstitutional." Harris v. McRae United States Supreme Court (1980)

The application of strict scrutiny is not flexible at all, and I can find no case in this state where application of this standard has resulted in upholding the challenged law. With the adoption of strict scrutiny, this Court has forced the State of Tennessee into an "all-or-nothing" scenario, where only the most impeccably drafted legislation withstands the slightest possibility of darkening the constitutional doorway. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v. Sundquist Tennessee Supreme Court (2000) Note: This citation goes beyond saying infringements on fundamental parental rights are presumptively unconstitutional, and clearly states essentially no legislative restrictions on parents will be upheld.

If the classification affects fundamental rights however, there is no presumption of constitutionality, and the classification will be sustained only if justified by a compelling state interest. Coles v. Ryan Illinois Appeals Court (1980)

==============================

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees Due Process and Equal Protection to all

"[n]o state shall.deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1

==============================

The state must meet a threshold prior to infringing upon fundamental rights

First, according to the Washington Supreme Court, the Constitution permits a State to interfere with the right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or potential harm to a child. Section 26.10.160(3) fails that standard because it requires no threshold showing of harm. Troxel v. Granville United States Supreme Court (2000)

The right of a parent not to be deprived of parental rights without a showing of fitness, abandonment or substantial neglect is so fundamental and basic as to rank among the rights contained in the State and Federal Constitutions" In re J.P. Utah Supreme Court (1982)

Likewise, following the analysis of the Tennessee Supreme Court in interpreting its state statutes and constitutions, we find that implicit in Georgia cases, statutory and constitutional law is that state interference with parental rights to custody and control of children is permissible only where the health or welfare of a child is threatened. Brooks v. Parkerson Georgia Supreme Court (1995)

For the constitutional requirement to be satisfied, before visitation can be ordered over the objection of the child's parents, a court must find an actual harm to the child's health or welfare without such visitation. Williams v. Williams Virginia Supreme Court (1998)

Examples of Tennessee's threshold standard

In 1993 in a grandparent visitation case the Tennessee Supreme Court held, "we believe that when no substantial harm threatens a child's welfare, the state lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement on the fundamental right of parents to raise their children as they see fit." Hawk v. Hawk Tennessee Supreme Court (1993)

In a 1995 parent vs. third party custody case, "Therefore, in a contest between a parent and a non-parent, a parent cannot be deprived of the custody of a child unless there has been a finding, after notice required by due process, of substantial harm to the child. Only then may a court engage in a "best interest of the child" evaluation in making a determination of custody." In re Adoption of a Female Child Tennessee Supreme Court (1995)

In a 1999 parental rights termination case, "Therefore Bond stands for the proposition that a natural parent may only be deprived of custody of a child upon a showing of substantial harm to the child." In re Askew Tennessee (1999)

A July 2001 parental abuse case, "In furtherance of that goal, and in the best interests of Pamela due to a threat of substantial harm, the juvenile court ordered a termination of visitation." "Although parents' have a right to raise, care for and have the companionship of their child under both Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions, these rights can be infringed upon if the court finds substantial harm threatens a child's welfare." "The court made clear that there must be a threshold finding of harm before the state can intervene in a parent-child relationship; however, once this finding of harm to the child is made, a determination of custody is made based on the "best interest of the child". This threshold finding of substantial harm was made when Pamela was found by the juvenile court to be abused, dependent, and neglected and removed form the custody of her parents and placed in foster care." DCS v. Cox Tennessee Appeals Court (2001)

An August 2001 divorced parent v. parent case, "We believe the parents' constitutional right of privacy as found by our Supreme Court in Hawk is applicable here where we have two fit parents, even if those parents are now divorced. Additionally, we believe the constitutional rights under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution are worthy of the same protection as is the constitutional right to privacy discussed in Hawk. Accordingly, the Trial Court could not restrict Father's otherwise lawful possession of a firearm absent a showing of risk of substantial harm to the child. The Trial Court made no such finding." Stillwell v. Stillwell Tennessee Appeals Court (2001) Note: This may be the first and only U.S. case where a harm standard was applied to divorced parents.

A standardized threshold (bright-line rule) is needed

Many threshold terms are in use, and the best seems to be "severe harm". It has a proper sense of urgency which strikes a balance between too low of threshold terms such as "harm" which implies virtually no barrier, and too high of ones like "serious danger" implying an impossible hurdle. When combined with the designation as a "bright line rule" that cuts cleanly and clearly between the state and parents in all circumstances, a trial judge will have no problem properly applying family law to any circumstance that he or she faces.

The state may not apply the best interest of the child standard nor infringe in the parent-child relationship prior to proving that a child is in severe harm

We too, agree that neither the legislature nor a court may properly intervene in parenting decisions absent significant harm to the child from those decisions. In so holding, we approve the logic of Santosky v. Kramer which applied a two-step process to child neglect cases leading to foster family placement. In Santosky, the Supreme Court approved New York's bifurcated proceeding requiring the state first to establish paternal unfitness before placing a child in foster care. This procedure assures parents that a "best interest of the child" analysis will not pit them against potential foster parents; rather, the state consider a child's "best interests" until the natural parents have been declared unfit. Hawk v Hawk Tennessee Supreme Court (1993) Note: In a case where parental rights are infringed to a much lesser degree than in a parent v. parent custody case, the Tennessee Supreme Court clearly states parents must be declared "unfit" prior to "best interests" being applied.

The proof in this case supports the trial court's finding that the father is not unfit to have custody, and that he has developed a substantial relationship with the child. It shows that the child is in no danger of substantial harm. The father, therefore, has a fundamental interest in parenting the child which precludes a "best interest" determination of custody. Petrosky v. Keene Tennessee Supreme Court (1995)

If the threshold of severe harm is found, any orders issued must be so as no less restrictive remedies can be contemplated

To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must show that a statute furthers a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically available. Bernal v. Fainter United States Supreme Court (1984)

Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law. City of Boerne v. Flores United States Supreme Court (1997)

T.C.A. § 36-6-101(a)(1) "In a suit for annulment, divorce or separate maintenance, where the custody of a minor child or minor children is a question, the court may,.award the care, custody and control of such child or children.as the welfare and interest of the child or children may demand" Note: This is Tennessee's custody statute for divorcing parents. No harm threshold is present, nor any requirement for narrow tailoring. This statute is facially unconstitutional on two grounds.

A statute must be followed as written

When "the language contained within the four corners of a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, the duty of the courts is simple and obvious, 'to say sic lex scripta, and obey it." Hawks v. City of Westmoreland Tennessee Supreme Court (1997)

Thus, a court must "presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." A statute, therefore, must be construed as it is written. Berryhill v. Rhodes Tennessee Supreme Court (2000)

T.C.A. § 36-6-301 After making an award of custody, the court shall, upon request of the non-custodial parent, grant such rights of visitation as will enable the child and the non-custodial parent to maintain a parent-child relationship. Note: A reasonable definition of the clause "enable the child and the non-custodial parent to maintain a parent-child relationship" is two to three overnights per week. Tennessee courts routinely allow moveaways, long stretches (weeks/months/years) where no parenting occurs, and other restrictions such as every other weekend visitation. All of these circumstances violate their own case law, "the language contained within the four corners of a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, the duty of the courts is simple and obvious, 'to say sic lex scripta, and obey it.", and can be challenged on this basis.

Parental rights are identical between natural parents, without regard to gender or marital status

The Constitution protects "the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children." Stanley v. Illinois United States Supreme Court (1972)

"The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." Johnson v. Calvert California Supreme Court (1993)

The Nales' position that this Court in Hawk limited the protection of parental rights to an "intact, nuclear family with fit parents" is untenable. Nale v. Robertson Tennessee Supreme Court (1994)

Parental Alienation

It is clear to this Court that both parents love their children. What concerns this Court most, however, and was apparently a concern to the trial court, is Wife's blatant attempt to alienate the affections of the children from their father. When loved by both parents, children should be taught to love and respect each parent equally. The reciprocation, in turn, will garner self-respect and a positive self image in the children. The record in this case lends absolutely no reason as to why the children should not be encouraged to respect and love their father. We do not find the record to show that Wife has supported such a healthy relationship between parent and child. Although Wife testified otherwise, her actions speak loud and clear. Varley v. Varley Tennessee Appeals Court (1996)

Effect on the parent-child relationship by being apart

Between parent and child, there is no monster like separateness. It can grow even faster than children, shutting first the heart, then the home, then history. Brooks v. Parkerson Georgia Supreme Court (1995)

Friendly Parent Doctrine

The Court stressed, the parent-child relationship "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Stanley v. Illinois United States Supreme Court (1972)

Custody and visitation arrangements should promote the development of a healthy relationship between children and both their parents. Solima v. Solima Tennessee Appeals Court (1998)

Parent vs. Third Party Custody

Therefore, in a contest between a parent and a non-parent, a parent cannot be deprived of the custody of a child unless there has been a finding, after notice required by due process, of substantial harm to the child. Only then may a court engage in a "best interest of the child" evaluation in making a determination of custody." In re Adoption of a Female Child Tennessee Supreme Court (1995)

Biological parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. These parental rights are superior to the rights of others and continue without interruption unless a biological parent consents to relinquish them, abandons his or her child, or forfeits his or her parental rights by some conduct that substantially harms the child. O' Daniel v. Messier Tennessee Appeals Court (1995)

Grandparent/third party visitation

This appeal presents the issue of the constitutionality of Georgia's "Grandparent Visitation Statute", OCGA § 19-7-3. We hold that the statute is unconstitutional under both our state and federal constitutions, and reverse the trial court's order to the contrary. Brooks v. Parkerson Georgia Supreme Court (1995)

Children in state care

Judge Quinones, a Family Court Judge with eight years of experience, described the conditions of detention as follows:

"Then again, Juvenile Center, as much as we might try, is not the most pleasant place in the world. If you put them in detention, you are liable to be exposing these youngsters to all sorts of things. They are liable to be exposed to assault, they are liable to be exposed to sexual assaults. You are taking the risk of putting them together with a youngster that might be much worse than they, possibly might be, and it might have a bad effect in that respect."

Many other observers of the circumstances of juvenile detention in New York have come to similar conclusions. Schall v. Martin United States Supreme Court (1984)

1st Amendment Protest Guarantees

We have recognized that the First Amendment reflects a "profound national commitment" to the principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," This has led us to scrutinize carefully any restrictions on public issue picketing. Boos v. Barry United States Supreme Court (1988)

The traditional approach sets forth a bright-line rule: any restriction on speech, the application of which turns on the content of the speech, is a content-based restriction regardless of the motivation that lies behind it. Boos v. Barry United States Supreme Court (1988)

Pro-Se litigant's pleadings

Pro se litigant's pleadings should not be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. "Significantly, the Haines case involved a pro se complaint - as does the present case - which requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer. Puckett v. Cox United States Court of Appeals (1972)

Section 2 Persuasive Arguments
Thus, apart from constitutional problems of using the best interest of the child standard without a prerequisite showing of harm, the vagueness and subjectivity of such a standard lends itself to an invasion of family privacy which is abhorrent to our current society. Kathleen Bean (1985-86) Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse? Note: This statement is equally applicable to all invasions of the parent-child relationship.

The bible advises input from both parents; "Hear, my son, your father's instruction, and reject not your mother's teaching;" Proverbs 1:8 Revised Standard Version

Hubin, Donald (1999). Parental Rights and Due Process. University of Utah Journal of Law & Family Studies Volume 1 Number 2, 123-150. Note: The best article on unconstitutionality of family law.

See at: www.cohums.ohio-state.edu/philo/people/faculty/hubin.1/Research/P RDP.PDF

See Childs Best Interest website generally for useful information: childsbestinterest.org

Section 3 Traps
When a legal action is initiated which involves a child, if a parent is not residing in the same home as the child, he or she will presumptively be considered as the non-custodial parent. The only way to avoid this trap is to not leave the home, or allow your child to be taken out of it.

When hiring an attorney, one of the first things they do is request financial information. This is because they are mentally figuring how much wealth they will be able to transfer to themselves.

At the filing of a legal action involving a child, if a temporary injunction is issued to maintain the status quo (keep the child under the care of one parent), the excluded parent will presumptively be considered as non-custodial. Any pre-trial orders which impede your ability to parent your child can be immediately appealed. If you wait for trial, you will waive your right to later raise these issues.

Pre-trial if a parent consents to pay child support, the judge and both attorneys will take this as a signal that he or she agrees to be the non-custodial parent.

Any consent order a parent agrees to (even if it comes after a contested hearing) cannot be appealed. You do not have to "consent" to anything, even if your attorney says otherwise. Remember, attorneys are officers of the court, and quite possibly friends with the judge and opposing attorney. They are required to zealously represent you, and to uphold the constitution. Expect neither.

Normally an investigation of the parents will be done. This can be anything from a college volunteer working for CASA, an attorney called a Guardian Ad Litem, a private investigator, up to a pediatric psychologist. The job of all these folks is to invade the privacy of your relationship with your child, and transfer as much wealth as possible to themselves. Also you will either be encouraged or mandated to attend counseling, to achieve the same goals. Using the above constitutional citations you can object to any invasion of your privacy and your child's. If you fail to object, you waive your rights.

At trial your attorney can have a pre-trial brief prepared which carefully identifies the applicable laws and how your case applies to those laws (including of course constitutional law). Very few attorneys will do this. Most will present your case with no reference to any laws whatsoever, and simply allow the judge to rule as he or she wishes.

Also at trial both parents are considered to be voluntarily submitting the question of child custody to the court. Your attorney can assert that you do not want custody of your child decided by the state. If you don't do this, it will be considered waived for appeal purposes, as will any applicable state and constitutional laws not raised by your attorney in his or her oral arguments.

If you ask that the law be followed in your case, expect intimidation tactics such as your attorney threatening to resign, or being told visitation with your child will be reduced. If any of this happens, request a brochure or other method whereby you can file a complaint with your state board of responsibility against the unlawful attorney. To make a complaint call: 1-800-486-5714

If you receive an unfavorable decision at trial, your attorney can file a motion to reconsider, or a notice of appeal. If you are appealing there are strict time limits on this, which if not followed will cause your case to be thrown out. If you consent to anything at trial, it will not be appeallable.

Appeals are usually taken to a state appellate court, then if needed an application is filed to your state supreme court (they may be called another name). The state supreme court has discretion whether to take your case or not, and they probably won't take it. If your state supreme court does not give you a favorable ruling, you can appeal properly preserved constitutional questions to the United State Supreme Court, which virtually never takes a family law case. Wherever your case finally stops, it will be considered final.

Section 4 Legal Primer
There are three types of law, constitutional, statutory, and case. Constitutional law is primarily what this paper consists of, it is written by the people, and everyone must follow it. Statutory law is created by your state legislature, and the judges and all citizens must follow it as written. Case law is the judge's interpretation of how constitutional and statutory law apply to individual cases. Most libraries will have copies of your state constitution, and statutory laws.

Solima v. Solima 7 S.W.3d 30, at 33 (Tenn.App.1998)

Being able to read case citations is very important as this enables you to look up and verify the original. In the above example the "style" of the case is Solima v. Solima, and these of course are the two parties at odds.

The next part 7 S.W.3d 30 tells you the original decision is contained in the "SouthWest" reporters. If you are unable to find them yourself, the law school librarian can show you where they are at. 7 is the volume number, 3d means third edition, and 30 is the page the case begins on. The at 33 is the specific page where the quote you are referring to is at, and (Tenn.App.1998) tells you the court that issued the decision and year it did so. If you see a case citation that has only the year listed without any court, such as (2000), that is a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court. NY or Utah would be a state supreme court, U.S.D.C. is a federal court, and U.S.C.A. is a federal appeals court.

If you are starting from scratch and don't have a case citation, ask the librarian where the "digests" for your state, or the "Corpus Secundum" are. These allow you to start with a subject, such as "constitutional law", and look up all of the cases cited in that area.

[Jim]

US Constitutional, State, and Federal Rights to Parent Your Children

Below are excerpts of case law from state, appellate, and federal district courts and up to the U.S. Supreme Court, all of which affirm, from one perspective or another, the absolute Constitutional right of parents to actually parent their children.
________________________________________
“The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by this amendment (First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14.” – Doe v. Irwin, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S. D.C. of Michigan, (1985)

Case Law:
Doe v. Irwin, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S. D.C. of Michigan, (1985).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S Ct 2479; 472 US 38, (1985).
Elrod v. Burns, 96 S Ct 2673; 427 US 347, (1976).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, (1886).
Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S Ct 1388; 455 US 745, (1982).
Matter of Delaney, 617 P 2d 886, Oklahoma (1980).
Langton v. Maloney, 527 F Supp 538, D.C. Conn. (1981).
Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S Ct 1598, 435 US 963, IL, (1977).
In the Interest of Cooper, 621 P 2d 437; 5 Kansas App Div 2d 584, (1980).
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F 2d 1205; US Ct App 7th Cir WI, (1984).
Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F Supp 620; DC, WI (1973).
May v. Anderson, 345 US 528, 533; 73 S Ct 840, 843, (1952).
In re: J.S. and C., 324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208, (1972).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390; 43 S Ct 625, (1923).
Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S Ct 549; 434 US 246, 255^Q56, (1978).
Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F 2d 651; US Ct App 9th Cir, (1985).
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 f 2d 1205, 1242^Q45; US Ct App 7th Cir WI, (1985).
Carson v. Elrod, 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976).
Franz v. U.S., 707 F 2d 582, 595^Q599; US Ct App (1983).
Matter of Gentry, 369 NW 2d 889, MI App Div (1983).
Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S Ct 1879; 466 US 429.
Orr v. Orr, 99 S Ct 1102; 440 US 268, (1979).
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US 7, 10; 95 S Ct 1373, 1376, (1975).
28 USCA § 2411; Pfizer v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532; cert denied 92 S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN, (1972).
Gross v. State of Illinois, 312 F 2d 257; (1963).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, (1965).
In re U.P., 648 P 2d 1364; Utah, (1982).
Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A 2d 593, (1956); Brennan v. Brennan, 454 A 2d 901, (1982).
Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, (1981).

[Jim]

“In a perfect world, having both parents there to raise the child is the right way,” he said, “but we’re not living in a perfect world. And during a divorce, people are not at their best.”

Mr. White misses the point in that the key factor is the current system pits each fit parent against one another and that causes "parents not to be at their best" and the child loses.

The Children's Family Act removes the need for the fighting process and places child rearing decisions on the fit parents, not the state of Alabama.

The following is where current Alabama law is failing children and each fit parent. Just because parents divorce does not make them unfit.

Over the 19 years of the Child's minority, an 80/20 “[Alabama] standard visitation" works out to only 4 years out of 19 with one parent. Is such court-ordered limited parenting time with only one of the Child’s two fit parents in the best interest of any Child?

The Supreme Court of the United States in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) said the following,

“[T]he Due Process [fundamental fairness] Clause [of the 14th Amendment] does not permit a State [judge] to infringe on the fundamental right of [Fit] Parents to make Child rearing decisions simply because a judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made."

This due process violation happens daily in Alabama courtrooms. Many times the judge in a contested Child custody determination will not state any reason whatsoever to support the decision. In the absence of findings of fact one or both parents are unfit (which then authorizes intrusion into the parent-child relationship by the court) a Trial Court’s lopsided Parenting time order is unconstitutionally overbroad.

Before the State may constitutionally implicate the fundamental liberty interest of a fit parent, there must be clear and convincing evidence of substantial harm by the Parent to the Child. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Otherwise, the State has no compelling interest which justifies the State [judges] dictating to the fit Parent what is in the best interest of the Child.

Therefore, until a Parent has been proven to be unfit by clear and convincing evidence, no factual condition precedent triggers the parens patriae authority of the State of Alabama to act in place of the fit Parent and decide what is in the best interest of the minor Child. In the typical custody case in which neither fit Parent has caused substantial harm to the Child, Constitutional principles of equal protection and due process require the State’s Child Parenting orders to treat each of the fit Parents as peers, i.e. the equals they are in both fact and law. Due process and equal protection of the laws require that equal citizens at the bar of justice be treated with equal dignity and respect at the bar of justice. In order to pass Constitutional muster, the State of Alabama’s Child Custody orders must scrupulously avoid discriminatory time split favoring either fit Parent - until one party has proven the requisite facts of parental unfitness, which then allows the State to constitutionally treat the Parents differently. This is not currently happening in Alabama family law and why The Alabama Children’s Family Act should become Alabama law.

Of course, the Alabama Court may enter any Parenting time Order which implements any Parenting plan the fit Parents may voluntarily agree. However, if the fit Parents do not agree on a Parenting plan, the Alabama Court’s only constitutionally compliant recourse is to Order equal Child custody between the two fit Parents. In so doing, the Alabama Court protects the constitutional right of the Child to freedom of association with each Parent, treats each Parent with the requisite respect and dignity due to a fit Parent, and equally protects the right the Child to a meaningful relationship with each fit Parent. To do otherwise not only violates the fundamental liberty interest of each fit Parent to a relationship with the minor Child free of unwarranted interference by the State of Alabama, it also violates the liberty interest of the minor Child to be with each fit Parent free of unwarranted interference by the State of Alabama.

Parenting time held to be equal can be any Parenting time arrangement, daily or weekly, when the Parent’s are located in close proximity to one another. Or in two to three year allotments when Parents live long distances apart. Children with Parents in the U.S. military are required to move to different duty stations every three to five years. If such move does not create instability for Children of military Parents, same is true for Children of divorced or unwed fit Parents. Stability for a child - absent a judicial determination of Parental unfitness - is a decision for fit Parents, not the State of Alabama.

BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD RESIDES FIRST IN THE FIT PARENT, NOT IN THE STATE

In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Supreme Court of the United States declared:

“[T]he best interest of the Child' resides in the fit Parent - not in the state: "Our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a Child is a "the mere creature of the State" and, on the contrary, asserted that Parents generally "have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their Children] for additional obligations.”

“The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that Parents possess what a Child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead Parents to act in the best interests of their Children. 442 U.S., at page 602.”

“Accordingly, so long as a Parent adequately cares for his or her Children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that Parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that Parent's Children.” See, e.g., Flores, 507 U.S., at page 304.”

STATE LAW MUST CONFORM TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

The Supreme Court of the United States in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), at page 18, quoting Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859), said the following:

"[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this [U.S. Supreme] Court ... is the supreme law of the land, and [the Constitution] makes it of binding effect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." At page 19, "Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to [the Constitution] "to support this Constitution." Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous [U.S. Supreme] Court, said that this requirement reflected the framers' "anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State …"

THE STATE CANNOT PRESUME UNFITNESS

[The U.S. Supreme Court] "held that a state cannot presume a Parent is unfit or that a Parent's exercise of his rights is harmful to his Child.” See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (cannot presume a Parent and Child's rights are divergent and that the Parent's exercise of his rights is thus harmful to the Child); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (cannot presume an unwed [Parent] is unfit to have custody of [his/her] Children).

"In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the [U. S. Supreme] Court held that the State of Illinois was barred, as a matter of both due process and equal protection, from taking custody of the Children of an unwed father, absent a hearing and a particularized finding that the father was an unfit Parent." Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247-48 (1978).

The State has no interest in interfering with the Parental rights of fit Parents because such Parents are presumed to act in their Child's best interests. Parham v. JR, 442 U.S., at page 602 (The "natural bonds of affection lead Parents to act in the best interests of their Children."); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at page 69, (applying the "presumption that a fit Parent will act in the best interest of his or her Child").